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Abstract. Non-repudiation protocols have an important role in many areas where secured
transactions with proofs of participation are necessary. Formal methods are clever and
without error, therefore using them for verifying such protocols is crucial. In this purpose,
we show how to partially represent non-repudiation as a combination of authentications
on the Fair Zhou-Gollmann protocol. After discussing the limitations of this method, we
define a new one, based on the handling of the knowledge of protocol participants. This
second method is general and of natural use, as it consists in adding simple annotations
in the protocol specification. It is very easy to implement in tools able to handle partic-
ipants knowledge. We have implemented it in the AVISPA Tool and analyzed the Fair
Zhou-Gollmann protocol and the optimistic Cederquist-Corin-Dashti protocol, discovering
attacks in each. This extension of the AVISPA Tool for handling non-repudiation opens
a highway to the specification of many other properties, without any more change in the
tool itself.
Keywords: cryptographic protocols, non-repudiation, fairness, authentication, automatic
analysis, AVISPA Tool.
1 Introduction
Authentication and secrecy properties of security protocols have been intensively studied for
years [23], but the interest of other properties such as non-repudiation and fairness has been
raised only in the 1990s with the explosion of Internet services and electronic transactions.3
Non-repudiation protocols are designed for verifying that, when two parties exchange infor-
mation over a network, neither one nor the other can deny having participated to this commu-
nication. Such a protocol must therefore generate evidences of participation to be used in case
of a dispute. The basic tools for non-repudiation services have been digital signatures and public
key cryptography. Indeed, a signed message is an evidence of participation and identity of the
other party [14].
The majority of the non-repudiation property analysis efforts in the literature are manually driven
though. One of the first efforts to apply formal methods to the verification of non-repudiation
protocols has been presented by Zhou et al. in [31], where they have used SVO logic. In [25]
Schneider uses process algebra CSP to prove the correctness of a non-repudiation protocol, the
well-known Fair Zhou-Gollmann protocol. With the same goal, Bella et al. have used the theo-
rem prover Isabelle [4]. Schneider has defined a rank function for encoding that in an execution
trace, an event happens before another event. The verification is done by analyzing traces in the
stable failures models of CSP. Among the automatic analysis attempts, we can cite Shmatikov
⋆ This work is supported by the ANR AVOTE´, http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/anr-avote/.
3 See [1] for a detailed list of publications related to the analysis of non-repudiation protocols.
and Mitchell [26] with Murϕ, a finite state model-checker, to analyze a fair exchange and two
contract signing protocols, Kremer and Raskin [15] with a game-based model, Armando et al. [3]
using LTL for encoding resilient channels in particular, the work of Gu¨rgens and Rudolph [9]
based on the asynchronous product automata (APA) and the simple homomorphism verification
tool (SHVT) [19], raising flaws in three variants of the Fair Zhou-Gollmann protocol and in two
other optimistic fair non-repudiation protocols [13, 29]. Wei and Heather [27] have used FDR,
with an approach similar to Schneider, for a variant of the Fair Zhou-Gollmann protocol with
timestamps.
The common point between all those works is that they use rich logics, with a classical bad
consequence for model checkers, the difficulty to consider large protocols. For avoiding this prob-
lem, Wei and Heather [28] have used PVS [22], but some of the proofs still had to be done by hand.
Fairness is a property that is more difficult to achieve: no party should be able to reach a
point where he has the evidence or the message he requires, without the other party also having
his required evidence. Fairness is not always required for non-repudiation protocols, but it is
usually desirable.
A variety of protocols has been proposed in the literature to solve the problem of fair message
exchange with non-repudiation. The first solutions were based on a gradual exchange of the
expected information [14]. However this simultaneous secret exchange is troublesome for actual
implementations because fairness is based on the assumption of equal computational power for
both parties, which is very unlikely in a real world scenario. A possible solution to this problem
is the use of a trusted third party (TTP), and in fact it has been shown that this is impossible
to achieve fair exchange without a TTP [18, 20]. The TTP can be used as a delivery agent to
provide simultaneous share of evidences. The Fair Zhou-Gollmann protocol [30] is a well known
example using a TTP as a delivery agent; a significant amount of work has been done over this
protocol and its derivations [4, 10, 21, 25, 31]. However, instead of passing the complete message
through the TTP and thus creating a possible bottleneck, recent evolution of protocols resulted
in efficient, optimistic versions, in which the TTP is only involved in case something goes wrong.
Resolve and abort sub-protocols must guarantee that every party can complete the protocol in
a fair manner and without waiting for actions of the other party.
One of these recent protocols is the optimistic Cederquist-Corin-Dashti (CCD) non-repudiation
protocol [6]. The CCD protocol has the advantage of not using session labels, unlike many others
in the literature [14, 17, 30, 25]. A session label typically consists of a hash of all message compo-
nents. Gu¨rgens et al. [10] have shown a number of vulnerabilities associated to the use of session
labels and, to our knowledge, the CCD protocol is the only optimistic non-repudiation protocol
that avoids altogether the use of session labels.
This paper presents a method for automatically verifying non-repudiation protocols in pres-
ence of an active intruder. Our method has been implemented in the AVISPA Tool [2]4 and we
illustrate it with examples. This tool, intensively used for defining Internet security protocols and
automatically analyzing their authentication and secrecy properties, did not provide any help for
considering non-repudiation properties.
We first consider non-repudiation analysis as a combination of authentication problems, applied
to the Fair Zhou-Gollmann protocol. We show the limitations of this representation and the
difficulties for proving non-repudiation properties using only authentications. Then, we define a
method based on the analysis of agents knowledge, permitting to handle non-repudiation and
fairness properties in a uniform framework. Our approach allows one to specify the logical prop-
4 http://www.avispa-project.org
erties in a natural way: they correspond to state invariants that are convincing properties for the
user. This method is easy to integrate in lazy verification systems, such as the AVISPA Tool,
and can also be integrated in any system able to handle agents (or intruder) knowledge. This
should permit, contrarily to more complex logics like LTL, to set up abstractions more easily
for considering unbounded cases. This should also permit to get a more efficient verification for
bounded cases. We illustrate this fact with the analysis of the optimistic Cederquist-Corin-Dashti
protocol.
In this paper, the defined techniques are based on the formal semantics presented in [7, 8] for the
AVISPA Tool.
2 Non-Repudiation Properties
Non-repudiation (NR) is a general property that is usually not clearly defined. It is described
by protocols designers as a set of required services, depending on the protocol and the required
security level. In particular, non-repudiation properties may differ whether a trusted third party
(TTP) is used or not in the protocol.
In the following, we recall the classical model independent definitions of non-repudiation
services required by most of the existing security applications (for e-commerce for example). All
these services are defined for a message sent by an originator agent to a recipient agent, possibly
via a delivery agent, a TTP.
Definition 1. The service of non-repudiation of origin, denoted NROB(A), provides the
recipient B with a set of evidences which ensures that the originator A has sent the message.
The evidence of origin is generated by the originator and held by the recipient. This property
protects the recipient against a dishonest originator.
Definition 2. The service of non-repudiation of receipt, denoted NRRA(B), provides the
originator A a set of evidences which ensures that the recipient B has received the message. The
evidence of receipt is generated by the recipient and held by the originator. This property protects
the originator against a dishonest recipient.
Definition 3. The service of non-repudiation of submission, denoted NRSA(B), provides
the originator A a set of evidences which ensures that he has submitted the message for delivery to
B. This service only applies when the protocol uses a TTP. Evidence of submission is generated
by the delivery agent, and will be held by the originator. This property protects the originator
against a dishonest recipient.
Definition 4. The service of non-repudiation of delivery, denoted NRDA(B), provides the
originator A a set of evidences which ensures that the recipient B has received the message.
This service only applies when the protocol uses a TTP. Evidence of delivery is generated by the
delivery agent, and will be held by the originator. This property protects the originator against a
dishonest recipient.
Definition 5. A service of fairness (also called strong fairness) for a non-repudiation protocol
provides evidences that, at the end of the protocol execution, either the originator has the evidence
of receipt of the message and the recipient has the evidence of origin of the corresponding message,
or none of them has any valuable information. This property protects the originator and the
recipient.
Definition 6. A service of timeliness for a non-repudiation protocol guarantees that, whatever
happens during the protocol run, all participants can reach a state that preserves fairness, in a
finite time.
Note that in general, sets of evidences such as NRO, NRR, NRS and NRD are composed
with messages signed by an agent.
After this informal use of the notion of evidence, let us consider for the sequel of this paper
the following definition.
Definition 7. An evidence for an agent A and a non-repudiation property P is a message, a
part of a message, or a combination of both, received by A that is necessary for guaranteeing
property P .
We will also consider the following definition of a valid service.
Definition 8. A non-repudiation service is valid if is satisfies the corresponding property.
Remark: In this paper, we consider the evidences given by the protocol designer as valid: without
intervention of an intruder, those evidences are sufficient to guarantee the non-repudiation service;
and in case of a dispute, a judge analyzing them will always be able to protect honest agents.
Thus, we suppose that evidences are correctly chosen, so that a judge can use them for building
proofs protecting honest agents.
3 Non-Repudiation as Authentication
It is well known that non-repudiation is a form of authentication [23]. In this section we use the
Fair Zhou-Gollmann protocol to demonstrate that properties like NRO, NRR,. . . can be at least
partially represented by authentication properties. However we show some strong limitations of
this approach, motivating the introduction of a new approach in the next section.
3.1 Running Example: the FairZG Protocol
In this section we describe the Fair Zhou-Gollmann protocol (FairZG) [31], a fair non-repudiation
protocol that uses a TTP. We have chosen this protocol as a case study to demonstrate our
analysis approach because of the existence of significant related work [4, 10, 21, 25]. The protocol
is presented below in Alice&Bob notation, where fNRO, fNRR, fSUB and fCON are labels used
to identify the purpose of messages.
1. A → B: fNRO.B.L.C.NRO
2. B → A: fNRR.A.L.NRR
3. A → TTP: fSUB.B.L.K.SubK
4. B ↔ TTP: fCON.A.B.L.K.ConK
5. A ↔ TTP: fCON.A.B.L.K.ConK
where A (for Alice) is the originator of the message M, B (for Bob) is the recipient of the message
M, TTP is the trusted third party, M is the message to be sent from Alice to Bob, C is a
commitment (the message M encrypted by a key K), L is a unique session identifier (also called
label), K is a symmetric key defined by Alice, NRO is a message used for non-repudiation of
origin (the message fNRO.B.L.C signed by Alice), NRR is a message used for non-repudiation of
receipt (the message fNRR.A.L.C signed by Bob), SubK is a proof of submission of K (the message
fSUB.B.L.K signed by Alice), ConK is a confirmation of K (the message fCON.A.B.L.K signed by
the TTP).
Non-repudiation properties of origin and receipt are defined by the protocol designers by the
following sets of terms:
NROB(A) = {NRO,ConK}
NRRA(B) = {NRR,ConK}
The main idea of this FairZG protocol is to split the delivery of a message into two parts. First
a commitment C, containing the message M encrypted by a key K, is exchanged between Alice and
Bob (message fNRO). Once Alice has an evidence of commitment from Bob (message fNRR), the
key K is sent to a trusted third party (message fSUB). Once the TTP has received the key, both
Alice and Bob can retrieve the evidence ConK and the key K from the TTP (messages fCON).
This last step is represented by a double direction arrow in the Alice&Bob notation because it is
implementation specific and may be composed by several message exchanges between the agents
and the TTP. In this scenario we assume that the network will not be down forever and both
Alice and Bob have access to the TTP’s shared repository where it stores the evidences and the
key. This means that the agents will be able to retrieve the key and evidences from the TTP
even in case of network failures.
3.2 Non-Repudiation of Origin as Authentication
In our example, the FairZG protocol, non-repudiation of origin should provide the guarantee that
if Bob owns NRO then Alice has sent M to Bob. Proposition 1 shows how this can be partially
ensured with a set of authentications.
Definition 9. auth(X,Y,D) is the non injective authentication, and means agent X authenticates
agent Y on data D.
The semantics of such a predicate is standard and can be found in [16]. The next two lemmas
present standard properties of authentication.
Lemma 1 (Subterm property). Given agents A and B, and message M, if auth(A,B,M), then
for each subterm s of M, accessible by composition/decomposition of M by both agents, auth(A,B,s)
is true.
Lemma 2 (Transitivity of authentication). Given agents A, B and C, and message M, if
auth(A,B,M) and auth(B,C,M), then auth(A,C,M).
Proposition 1. Given the FairZG protocol, if auth(B,A,NRO), auth(B,TTP,ConK) and
auth(TTP,A,SubK) are valid, then the non-repudiation service of origin NROB(A) is valid.
Proof. For the two evidences of NROB(A) = {NRO,ConK}, we have:
– NRO = SigA(fNRO.B.L.{M}K): since auth(B,A,NRO) is valid, there is an agreement between
B and A on SigA(fNRO.B.L.C). From the subterm property, this also means an agreement on
{M}K, thus A has sent the {M}K that B holds.
– ConK = SigTTP(fCON.A.B.L.K): as above auth(B,TTP,ConK) implies an agreement on K be-
tween B and TTP. Furthermore SubK = SigA(fSUB,B, L,K), thus auth(TTP,A,SubK) implies
an agreement on K between TTP and A. By transitivity we have an agreement on K between
B and A which means that A has sent K to TTP, that same K that B got from TTP.
As A has sent {M}K and K, it means that he has generated M and run the protocol in order to
transmit it to B.
Non-injective authentication is only required for auth(B,TTP,ConK) because B can ask many
times ConK. However since all authentications imply an agreement on the unique session identifier
L, this protects from authentication across different sessions. 
3.3 Non-Repudiation of Receipt as Authentication
In our example, the FairZG protocol, non-repudiation of receipt should provide the guarantee
that if Alice owns NRR then Bob has received M from Alice. Proposition 2 shows how this can
be partially done with a set of authentications.
Proposition 2. Given the FairZG protocol, if auth(A,B,NRR), auth(A,TTP,ConK) and
auth(B,TTP,ConK) are valid, then the non-repudiation service of receipt NRRA(B) is valid.
Proof. For the two evidences of NRRA(B) = {NRR,ConK}, we have:
– NRR = SigB(fNRR.A.L.{M}K): a reasoning as for NRO in Proposition 1 ensures that B has
received {M}K.
– ConK = SigTTP(fCON.A.B.L.K): auth(A,TTP,ConK) implies an agreement on K between A and
TTP. Furthermore auth(B,TTP,ConK) implies an agreement on K between B and TTP. This
means that there is an agreement on K between A and B, thus when A holds ConK, B has
received or will be able to receive K.
The proof end is similar to the one of Proposition 1. 
3.4 Limitations and Difficulties
We have just illustrated on the FairZG protocol how to represent some non-repudiation properties
using authentication. This shows that non-repudiation can be handled by most existing protocol
analyzers, as most of them can handle authentication.
However, this only permits to partially handle non-repudiation:
1. The main problem is to apply Propositions 1 and 2 in automatic tools, since the authentica-
tion property is usually encoded by an annotation pair (for example “witness”/“request” in
AVISPA). In such a situation we cannot handle dishonest agents since for example with the
NROB(A) service, a dishonest Bob could forge a fake evidences set without executing the
“request” annotation. In such a case there is no authentication failure but the service is not
valid.
More generally dishonest agents can always act so that authentications in which they are
involved fail or not, by generating wrong authentication “requests”, or wrong “witnesses”.
This is the reason why tools like AVISPA do not handle authentications involving the in-
truder. This is also why with our representation of non-repudiation, the AVISPA tool does
not find any error in the FairZG protocol, while this is possible to prove that the protocol is
not fair when agent A is dishonest [9] (see Section 4.4 for details of this attack).
In order to avoid this kind of problems we need to prove that Bob could only own NRO
if Alice has actually sent the correct protocol messages. This may be done as for example
in [25], [27] or [10] but this is not trivial.
2. Another problem with the handling of non-repudiation as authentications is that it is difficult
to apply to optimistic non-repudiation protocols that include sub-protocols like abort and
resolve as presented in the next section. One of the main difficulties is that such protocols
are non-deterministic.
As a conclusion, proving non-repudiation with the help of authentications does not seem to be
the best way; this is why in the next section we propose another simple and complete approach
for handling non-repudiation.
4 Non-Repudiation based on Agent Knowledge
In this section, we present a new method for considering non-repudiation services and fairness in
a uniform framework: we introduce a logic permitting to describe states invariants. This logic is
a very classical one, except that we define two new predicates, deduce and aknows that permit
to consider agents knowledge in the description of goals. The aknows predicate is also used as a
protocol annotation, with the following semantics: agent X knows (or can deduce) term t.
All our work is based on the standard formal semantics described in [7, 8] for the AVISPA
Tool.
4.1 Description of Non-Repudiation Properties
The main role of a non-repudiation protocol is to give evidences of non-repudiation to the parties
involved in the protocol. To analyze this kind of protocol, one must verify which participants
have their non-repudiation evidences at the end of the protocol execution. For example, if the
originator has all its evidences for non-repudiation of receipt, then the service of non-repudiation
of receipt is guaranteed. If the recipient has all its evidences for non-repudiation of origin, then
the service of non-repudiation of origin is guaranteed. If both parties (or none of them) have
their evidences, fairness is guaranteed. In other words, to analyze non-repudiation, we need to
verify if a set of terms is known by an agent at the end of the protocol execution.
And for considering a large class of non-repudiation protocols, we shall not restrict evidences
to a set of terms, but we have to consider them as a combination of terms using standard logical
connectors (conjunction, disjunction, negation).
For considering non-repudiation and fairness properties involving honest and dishonest agents,
we have defined a new predicate that permits to access the knowledge of protocol participants.
This predicate, named aknows (for agent knows), is used in protocols specifications for annotating
transitions and for defining properties.
Definition 10 (NR X(Y )). Let A be a set of agents playing a finite number of sessions of a
protocol, T a set of terms sent in the messages of this protocol and E the subset of terms in T that
are part of the evidences of non-repudiation in the protocol. For agents X, Y ∈ A, NR X(Y ) is
a logical combination of terms t ∈ E that constitute the evidence for a service of non-repudiation
NR for agent X wrt. agent Y .
Definition 11 (aknows). Let A be a set of agents playing a finite number of sessions of a
protocol, P the set of processes (ie. instances of protocol roles) involved in those sessions, and T
a set of terms. The protocol annotation aknows(X, p, t) is a predicate with X ∈ A, p ∈ P and
t ∈ T , asserting that agent X, playing a role of the protocol as process p, knows (or can deduce)
the term t.
The semantics of predicate aknows(X, p, t) is that the term t can be composed by agent X,
according to its current knowledge in process p of the protocol, whether this agent is honest
or not. This composability test can be easily done by any tool that is able to manage agents
knowledge or intruder knowledge.
By abuse of notation, we may write aknows(X, p, L), for a logical formula L combining evi-
dences (NR X(Y ) for example), considering that the predicate aknows is an homomorphism:
aknows(X, p, L1 ∧ L2) = aknows(X, p, L1) ∧ aknows(X, p, L2)
aknows(X, p, L1 ∨ L2) = aknows(X, p, L1) ∨ aknows(X, p, L2)
aknows(X, p,¬L) = ¬aknows(X, p, L)
Definition 12 (deduce). Let A be a set of agents playing a finite number of sessions of a
protocol and T a set of terms. We define deduce(X, t), with X ∈ A and t ∈ T , as the predicate
which means that X can deduce t from its knowledge.
We will use the same abuse of notation for deduce as for aknows.
The aknows predicate is used in protocol transitions for indicating that an agent knows an
important information; it corresponds to a fact; it has the same meaning when used in the de-
scription of a property, but also indicates that protocol transitions have really been run.
The deduce predicate is used in properties description for indicating a deducible knowledge.
As a consequence, we can assume that each aknows annotation in protocols transitions corre-
sponds to a valid deduce predicate on the same information; this assumption permits to avoid
bad annotations.
Definition 13 (well-formedness). The evidence NR X(Y ) is well-formed if it contains in-
formation that uniquely identifies processes of X and Y involved in the protocol session, and
an injective function of the message M for which NR acts as a protection against a dishonest
agent.
We now give the results obtained by this representation.
Proposition 3. Given a non-repudiation service of B against A about a message M with the
well-formed evidence NR B(A) for processes pB and pA of B and A respectively. If the following
formulae are true at the end of process pB of B, then the non-repudiation service is valid.
aknows(B, pB ,NR B(A))⇒ aknows(A, pA,M)
deduce(B,NR B(A)) ⇒ aknows(B, pB ,NR B(A))
Proof. A sketch of proof is as follows: by the second implication if B is able to deduce NR B(A)
then aknows(B, pB ,NR B(A)) is included in its knowledge, since by well-formedness ofNR B(A),
NR B(A) and aknows(B, pB ,NR B(A)) are related to the same process pB .
And again by well-formedness of NR B(A), it includes all the information uniquely identi-
fying M , thus the first implication implies an agreement on M between B and A. Finally as
aknows(A, pA,M) is an annotation, this means that A has followed the protocol, thus he has
done what he must do with M . 
Remark: Verifying formulae given in the above Proposition is not a problem, because a priori
any theorem prover (able to consider secrecy) can compute whatever can be deduced by an agent
at a given step of the protocol, especially concerning the deduce predicate [12].
Corollary 1. Given a non-repudiation service of origin for B against A about message M ,
involving processes pB and pA of B and A respectively. If NROB(A)) is well-formed and the
following formulae are true at the end of process pB, then the service is valid.
aknows(B, pB ,NROB(A))⇒ aknows(A, pA,M)
deduce(B,NROB(A)) ⇒ aknows(B, pB ,NROB(A))
Corollary 2. Given a non-repudiation service of receipt for A against B about message M ,
involving processes pA and pB of A and B respectively. If NRRA(B)) is well-formed and the
following formulae are true at the end of process pA, then the service is valid.
aknows(A, pA,NRRA(B))⇒ aknows(B, pB ,M)
deduce(A,NRRA(B)) ⇒ aknows(A, pA,NRRA(B))
4.2 Description of Fairness
In the literature, authors often give different definitions of fairness for non-repudiation protocols.
In some definitions none of the parties should have more evidences than the others at any given
point in time. Others have a more flexible definition in which none of them should have more
evidences than the others at the end of the protocol run. In many works it is also not very clear
if only successful protocol runs are taken into account, or partial protocol runs are valid as well.
In this paper we consider the flexible definition of fairness, taking into account complete
protocol runs. By complete protocol runs we mean a run where, even though the protocol could
not have reached its last transition for all agents, there is no executable transition left, i.e. all
possible protocol steps have been executed, but this does not mean that all agents are in a final
state.
We define this standard notion of fairness as a function of non-repudiation of origin and of
non-repudiation of receipt. If both properties, NRO and NRR, are ensured or both are not valid
for a given message M , then we have fairness.
Proposition 4. Given a protocol whose purpose is to send a message from Alice to Bob, we
have the following equivalence concerning the standard definition of fairness for processes pA and
pB of Alice and Bob respectively. If the non-repudiation is valid for the NRO and NRR services
then:
Fairness ≡ ( aknows(Bob, pB ,NROBob(Alice)) iff aknows(Alice, pA,NRRAlice(Bob)) )
This result can be generalized to fairness wrt. a set of non-repudiation services as follows.
Theorem 1. Given a protocol involving a finite number of agents, given a finite set of valid
non-repudiation services NR, the protocol is fair wrt. NR iff
∀NRS1X1(Y1),NRS2X2(Y2) ∈ NR,
aknows(X1, p1,NRS1X1(Y1)) iff aknows(X2, p2,NRS2X2(Y2))
4.3 Running Example: CCD
For illustrating the analysis method described above, we use in this section a recent protocol,
the Cederquist-Corin-Dashti (CCD) optimistic non-repudiation protocol [6]. The CCD protocol
has been created for permitting an agent A to send a message M to an agent B in a fair manner.
This means that agent A should get an evidence of receipt of M by B (EOR) if and only if B has
really received M and the evidence of origin from A (EOO). EOR permits A to prove that B has
received M , while EOO permits B to prove that M has been sent by A. The protocol is divided
into three sub-protocols: the main protocol, an abort sub-protocol and a resolve sub-protocol.
The Main Protocol. It describes the sending of M by A to B and the exchange of evidences
in the case where both agents can complete the entire protocol. If this direct communication
cannot be completed, in order to finish properly the protocol, the agents execute the abort or
the resolve sub-protocol with a trusted third party (TTP ).
The main protocol is therefore composed of the following messages exchanges, described in
the Alice&Bob notation:
1. A → B : {M}K .EOOM where EOOM = {B.TTP.H({M}K).{K.A}Kttp}inv(Ka)
2. B → A : EORM where EORM = {EOOM}inv(Kb)
3. A → B : K
4. B → A : EORK where EORK = {A.H({M}K).K}inv(Kb)
where K is a symmetric key freshly generated by A, H is a one-way hash function, Kg is the
public key of agent g and inv(Kg) is the private key of agent g (used for signing messages). Note
that we assume that all public keys are known by all agents (including dishonest agents).
In the first message, A sends the message M encrypted by K and the evidence of origin for
B (message signed by A, so decryptable by B). In this evidence, B checks his identity, learns the
name of the TTP, checks that the hash code is the result of hashing the first part of the message,
but he cannot decrypt the last part of the evidence; this last part may be useful if any of the
other sub-protocols is used.
B answers by sending the evidence of receipt for A, A checking that EORM is EOOM signed
by B.
In the third message, A sends the key K, permitting B to discover the plaintext message M .
Finally, B sends to A another evidence of receipt, permitting A to check that the symmetric key
has been received by B.
The Abort Sub-Protocol. The abort sub-protocol is executed by agent A if he does not
receive the message EORM at step 2 of the main protocol. The purpose of this sub-protocol is
to cancel the messages exchange.
1. A → TTP : {abort.H({M}K).B.{K.A}Kttp}inv(Ka)
2. TTP → A :


ETTP where ETTP = {A.B.K.H({M}K)}inv(Kttp)
if resolved(A.B.K.H({M}K))
ABTTP where ABTTP = {A.B.H({M}K).{K.A}Kttp}inv(Kttp)
otherwise
In this sub-protocol, A sends to the TTP an abort request, containing the abort label and some
information about the protocol session to be aborted.
According to what the TTP knows about this protocol session, he has two possible answers: if this
is the first problem received by the TTP for this protocol session, the TTP sends a confirmation
of abortion, ABTTP , and stores in its database that this protocol session has been aborted; but
if the TTP has already received a request for resolving this protocol session, he sends to A the
information for completing his evidence of receipt by B, ETTP .
The Resolve Sub-Protocol. The role of this second sub-protocol is to permit agents A and B
to finish the protocol in a fair manner, if the main protocol cannot be run until its end by some
of the parties. For example, if B does not get K or if A does not get EORK , they can invoke
the resolve sub-protocol.
1. G → TTP : EORM
2. TTP → G :
{
ABTTP if aborted(A.B.K.H({M}K))
ETTP otherwise
where G stands for A or B.
A resolve request is done by sending EORM to the TTP. If the protocol session has already
been aborted, the TTP answers by the abortion confirmation, ABTTP . If this is not the case, the
TTP sends ETTP so that the user could complete its evidence of receipt (if G is A) or of origin
(if G is B). Then the TTP stores in its database that this protocol session has been resolved.
Agents’ Evidences. For this protocol, according to [6], the logical expressions of evidences are:
NROB(A) = {M}K ∧ EOOM ∧K
NRRA(B) = {M}K ∧ EORM ∧ (EORK ∨ ETTP )
Note that there are two possibilities of evidences for non-repudiation of receipt, according to the
way the protocol is run.
According to our method, we simply have to annotate protocol steps with aknows predicates,
and then write the logical formula to be verified.
Non-repudiation of Origin. The following table shows where those annotations take place in
the three CCD sub-protocols, for considering non-repudiation of origin.
NROB(A) Protocol - step
aknows(B, pB , {M}K) Main - 1.
aknows(B, pB , EOOM ) Main - 1.
aknows(B, pB ,K) Main - 3.
aknows(B, pB ,K) Resolve - 2.
Note that the key K can be obtained either by the third message of the main protocol, or by
the second message of the resolve sub-protocol. One annotation has to be put in each of those
protocol steps.
By Corollary 1, non-repudiation of origin for the CCD protocol is represented by the
following invariant formulae:
aknows(B, pB , {M}K ∧ EOOM ∧K)⇒ aknows(A, pA,M)
deduce(B, {M}K ∧ EOOM ∧K)⇒ aknows(B, pB , {M}K ∧ EOOM ∧K)
Non-repudiation of Receipt. The following table shows where those annotations take place
in the three CCD sub-protocols, for considering non-repudiation of receipt.
NRRA(B) Protocol - step
aknows(A, pA, {M}K) Main - 1.
aknows(A, pA, EORM ) Main - 2.
aknows(A, pA, EORK) Main - 4.
aknows(A, pA, ETTP ) Abort - 2.
aknows(A, pA, ETTP ) Resolve - 2.
For this property, ETTP can be obtained from the second message of the abort sub-protocol or
of the resolve sub-protocol.
According to Corollary 2, non-repudiation of receipt for the CCD protocol is represented
by the following invariant formulae:
aknows(A, pA, {M}K ∧ EORM ∧ (EORK ∨ ETTP ))⇒ aknows(B, pB ,M)
deduce(A, pA, {M}K ∧ EORM ∧ (EORK ∨ ETTP ))⇒
aknows(A, pA, {M}K ∧ EORM ∧ (EORK ∨ ETTP ))
Fairness. For analyzing fairness, this protocol requires timeliness, that is each participant
should reach a final state before testing fairness. Fairness for the CCD protocol is described by
the following logical formula, a very simple application of Theorem 1:
aknows(A, pA,NRRA(B))⇔ aknows(B, pB ,NROB(A))
Basically the property states that if A knows the EOR evidence ({M}K , EORM , and EORK
or ETTP ), then B knows the EOO evidence. And symmetrically for B, if B knows the EOO
evidence ({M}K , EOOM and K), then A knows the EOR evidence.
Experiments. The CCD protocol has been specified in the AVISPA Tool, with the description
of the fairness property given above. The detailed formulae used in the AVISPA Tool, with an
LTL syntax, are:

0
@
0
@
aknows(A, pA, {M}K) ∧
aknows(A, pA, EORM ) ∧
(aknows(A, pA, EORK) ∨ aknows(A, pA, ETTP ))
1
A ⇒
0
@
aknows(B, pB , {M}K) ∧
aknows(B, pB , EOOM ) ∧
aknows(B, pB , K)
1
A
1
A

0
@
0
@
aknows(B, pB , {M}K) ∧
aknows(B, pB , EOOM ) ∧
aknows(B, pB , K)
1
A ⇒
0
@
aknows(A, pA, {M}K) ∧
aknows(A, pA, EORM ) ∧
(aknows(A, pA, EORK) ∨ aknows(A, pA, ETTP ))
1
A
1
A
Several scenarios have been run, and two of them have raised an attack, showing that the
CCD protocol does not provide the fairness property for which it has been designed.
The first attack has been found for a scenario with only one protocol session where A, an
honest agent, plays the protocol with a dishonest agent B (named i, for intruder). As soon as
i has received the first message from A, he builds EORM and sends it to the TTP as resolve
request. Later, when A, not receiving EORM , decides to abort the protocol, this is too late: the
protocol has already been resolved, the intruder can get M and build the proof that A has sent
M , and A cannot build the evidence of receipt, as he will never get EORM .
The trace of this attack is the following:
1. A → i : {M}K .EOOM
2. i → TTP : RESOLVE
3. TTP → i : ETTP
*** timeout for A ***
4. A → TTP : ABORT
5. TTP → A : ETTP
The second attack is a variant where both A and B are honest agents. The only difference
is that B sends EORM to A, but this message is intercepted by the intruder and never delivered
to A. At this point, the protocol is blocked, both agents waiting for a message. So, each agent
will ask the help of the TTP for concluding the protocol: A will invoke the abort sub-protocol
and B will invoke the resolve sub-protocol. And if the resolve request reaches the TTP before
the abort request 5, B will get all his necessary evidences from the TTP, while A, having asked
for an abort, will not be able to get all his evidences even with the help of the TTP.
The originality of this attack is that, at the end:
– A will guess (according to the answer received to his abort request) that the protocol has
been resolved by B, so he will assume that B knows M and can build the proof that A has
sent it; but A cannot prove this;
– B has resolved the protocol and has received from the TTP the information for getting M
and building the proof that A has sent M ; but he does not know that A does not have his
proof;
– the TTP cannot know that A has not received EORM ; so he knows that B can build its
evidences, but he cannot know if A can or not.
5 Note that this is possible even if channels are protected or pervasive, as agents use different channels;
this is also possible if B has a shorter timeout than A; this notion of timeout is essential in the
implementation of protocols, as demonstrated by Carbonell et al. in [5].
So, those attacks show that the CCD protocol is not fair, even if both agents A and B are honest.
The attack is due to a malicious intruder or a network problem, and the TTP is of no help for
detecting the problem.
Correcting the protocol is not difficult, for example by sending EORM together with ETTP
in the abort sub-protocol, when the protocol is already resolved. The numerous scenarios that
have been tried for this new version have not raised any attack. This experiment on the CCD
protocol is detailed in [24].
4.4 Back to the FairZG Protocol
We have illustrated in Section 3 the representation of non-repudiation properties by authentica-
tions with the FairZG protocol, raising some limitations and difficulties for an automatic analysis.
We have also analyzed this protocol with our second method, based on agents knowledge.
This protocol is known for having an attack when agent A is dishonest [9]. Indeed in [31], it
is not specified whether or not the TTP should store ConK forever. And from the TTP point of
view, a transaction is closed once both A and B have retrieved ConK, so he could delete all the
information about this transaction.
When the TTP acts in that way, Gu¨rgens and Rudolph have described an attack: a first
session is run until its end between A and B; then, A starts a second session with B, using the
same K and L as in the first session, but with a different message M2; if B does not remark the
similarity of the sessions, he will answer to A; but once A has got NRR, he can stop the session,
not sending the third message of the protocol; at that point, A owns NRR from the second session
and ConK from the first session, and this constitutes the evidences of receipt of M2 by B; on his
side, B will never be able to get ConK from the TTP and will never know how to decrypt M2.
So, this attack is due to the hypothesis that the TTP does not keep information on closed
sessions. We have modeled this hypothesis by using two parallel processes for the TTP, one for
each session. And we have found the same attack.
5 Conclusion
Non-repudiation protocols have an important role in many areas where secure transactions with
proofs of participation are necessary. The evidences of origin and receipt of a message are two
examples of elements that the parties should own at the end of a communication. We have given
two very different examples of such protocols. The FairZG protocol is an intensively studied
protocol in which the role of the trusted third party is essential. The CCD protocol is a more
recent non-repudiation protocol that avoids the use of session labels and distinguishes itself by
the use of an optimistic approach, the trusted third party being used only in case of a problem
in the execution of the main protocol.
The fairness of a non-repudiation protocol is a property difficult to analyze and there are
very few tools that can handle the automatic analysis of this property.
The contribution of this work is twofold. First, we have illustrated with the FairZG proto-
col how difficult it is to consider full non-repudiation properties using only a combination of
authentications.
Second, we have defined a new method that permits to handle in a very easy way non-
repudiation properties and fairness in a uniform framework. This method is based on the handling
of agents knowledge and can be used to automatically analyze non-repudiation protocols as
well as contract signing protocols [26]. We have implemented it in the AVISPA Tool and have
successfully applied it to the CCD and FairZG protocols, proving that they are not fair. We have
also tested other specifications of the CCD protocol, for example with secure communication
channels between agents and the TTP, no attack has been found; but using such channels is not
considered as acceptable, because it generates an overload of the TTP activity.
Our method, based on the writing of simple state invariants, is of easy use, and can be
implemented in any tool handling agents (or intruder) knowledge. It should be very helpful
for setting abstractions for handling unbounded scenarios, and it should be very efficient for
bounded verifications, as it has been the case in our implementation. We hope that this work
will open a highway to the specification of many other properties, without any more change in
the specification languages and the analysis engines.
Our work has been done for analyzing non-repudiation protocols. A complementary ap-
proach has been defined by Guttman in [11], where he describes a protocol design process,
based on authentication tests, permitting to guarantee some security properties, including some
non-repudiation properties. Note that in the example presented by Guttman, fairness is not
considered.
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